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つくばリポジトリ (Tulips-R) >
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Journal of economic dynamics & control >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/103811
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| Title: | Learning Games |
| Authors: | Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Ishikawa, Ryuichiro
Akiyama, Eizo
花木, 伸行
石川, 竜一郎
秋山, 英三 |
| Issue Date: | Oct-2009 |
| Publisher: | ElsevierB.V. |
| Journal Title: | Journal of economic dynamics & control |
| Volume: | 33 |
| Issue: | 10 |
| Start Page: | 1739 |
| End Page: | 1756 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.013 |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not
only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The
model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination
games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at
learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy
higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one
player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others.
However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow
learners. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2241/103811 |
| Rights: | © 2009ElsevierB.V. |
| Text Version: | author |
| Appears in Collections: | 石川 竜一郎 (Ishikawa Ryuichiro)
Journal of economic dynamics & control
花木 伸行 (HANAKI Nobuyuki)
秋山 英三 (Akiyama Eizo)
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